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CASES UNDER MAINE LAW, SHOULD MAINE 
COURTS CONTINUE TO APPLY THE MCDONNELL 
DOUGLAS ANALYSIS AT THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT STAGE? 
Ari B. Solotoff* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2003, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has applied the Supreme 
Court’s McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis on summary judgment in 
employment discrimination claims brought under Maine law.1  Recently, however, 
some justices of the Law Court have questioned McDonnell Douglas’s continuing 
application to summary judgment determinations.  They argue that the framework 
is outdated, overly mechanical, and unnecessary.2  In Trott v. H.D. Goodall 
Hospital,3 the court set forth three guiding principles for lawyers and judges to 
follow in employment discrimination cases facing disposition at summary 
judgment.4  In doing so, the court signaled that McDonnell Douglas should 
continue to be applied at summary judgment because the analysis is a valuable and 
necessary interpretive device for defining the substantive law of intentional 
discrimination.5  The court’s synthesis of the principles governing summary 
judgment decisions in employment discrimination cases also sharpened the analysis 
for contemporary use.  Thus, Maine courts need not discontinue use of McDonnell 
Douglas and should continue to apply it at summary judgment. 
Claire Trott served as a nurse at H.D. Goodall Hospital for close to twenty 
years.6  Following the termination of her employment from the Hospital in 2009, 
Trott complained that she was discharged in violation of Maine’s Whistleblower 
Protection Act (WPA) and because of her participation in a deposition for a 
wrongful death suit brought against the Hospital.7  Pursuant to the Act,8 Trott 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maine School of Law.  The author wishes to thank 
Professors Dmitry Bam and Melvyn Zarr for their invaluable feedback and guidance on this Note.  In 
addition to his family and friends, the author is deeply appreciative of his colleagues on the Maine Law 
Review for their ongoing assistance and support.  This Note is dedicated to the memory of Lawrence 
Solotoff (1945-2014), civil rights attorney and co-author of the treatise SEX DISCRIMINATION AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORK PLACE (Law Journal Press 2014). 
 1. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra Part III.E. 
 3. 2013 ME 33, 66 A.3d 7. 
 4. See infra Part III.D. 
 5. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (holding that submission of a 
factual dispute to the jury must be guided by the applicable substantive evidentiary standards). 
 6. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, 66 A.3d 7 (No. 
YOR-12-213). 
 7. Id. 
 8. The statute provides in relevant part: “No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location or 
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submitted a complaint to the Maine Human Rights Commission, alleging that the 
Hospital severed her employment in retaliation for the deposition testimony she 
provided as part of the wrongful death suit.9  The Hospital contended that it 
discharged Trott for falsification of a medical record in violation of Hospital 
policy.10  The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the Hospital, 
concluding that Trott failed to produce evidence showing a causal link between her 
discharge and her participation in the deposition as required by the statute.11 
In Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hospital, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as 
the Law Court, reversed the grant of summary judgment to the Hospital.12  The 
case involved a claim of employment discrimination and the court applied the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to the causation element of the 
WPA.13  Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of 
establishing a “prima facie case” that unlawful discrimination motivated the 
employee’s discharge.14  After the employee meets this initial burden, the employer 
must produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
action.15  If the employer does not produce an explanation, or if the employee 
demonstrates that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual, then the employee has 
made out a “prima facie case” in the more general sense, and has met the 
employee’s burden of production on all the elements of a claim for 
discrimination.16  Evidence of pretext, therefore, is crucial for the plaintiff to 
survive summary judgment. 
Under the WPA, an employee must prove three elements to prevail on a 
discrimination claim: (1) the employee was asked to participate in a court action; 
(2) the employee was subject to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a 
“causal link” between the protected activity and the adverse action.17  The Hospital 
conceded that Trott’s discharge was an adverse employment action.18  The Law 
Court further concluded that Trott’s deposition testimony was a “court action” 
within the meaning of the WPA.19  The question for the court was whether Trott 
had met her burden of production on the issue of causation.20  As a matter of 
substantive law interpretation of the WPA, the court applied the three-step burden-
                                                                                                     
privileges of employment because . . . [t]he employee is requested to participate in an investigation, 
hearing or . . . a court action.”  26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1)(C) (2013). 
 9. Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 10, 66 A.3d 7.  
 10. Id.   
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. ¶ 26. 
 13. Id. ¶ 15. 
 14. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  See Denny Chin & Jodi 
Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in 
Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 663-64 (1998) (discussing the four specific elements of 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case as they have evolved in the Second Circuit, as well as some of the 
confusion that has arisen regarding the elements). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 804. 
 17. See 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4572(1)(A), 4621 (2013); 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1)(C) (2013).  See also Costain 
v. Sunbury Primary Care, P.A., 2008 ME 142, ¶ 6, 954 A.2d 1051. 
 18. Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 11, 66 A.3d 7. 
 19. Id. ¶ 12. 
 20. Id. ¶ 14. 
574 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:2 
shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas and concluded that Trott had met her 
burden of production.21  The court then vacated the decision and remanded, holding 
that when viewing the summary judgment record from the “full range of reasonable 
perceptions . . . a reasonable juror could conclude that the Hospital’s articulated 
reason for discharging her was” pretextual,22 and that Trott was entitled to have her 
claim heard by a jury.23 
Two justices of the Law Court concurred in the result, but contended, as they 
had done a year earlier in another case,24 that Maine courts should no longer apply 
McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.25  
The concurring opinion can be read either as disagreeing with the meaning or 
interpretation of the state substantive law when analyzing the causation element of 
a WPA claim, or as disagreeing with application of that substantive law at the 
summary judgment stage.  The latter reading of the concurring justices in Trott 
follows from their stance as articulated in Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care 
Facility26: applying McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment merely confuses the 
ultimate issue of whether there is evidence of employment discrimination.27  
Questioning the “continued vitality of the burden-shifting analysis,”28 the 
concurrence reasserted that courts should return to the “straightforward and 
objective inquiry pursuant to Rule 56.”29 
Thus, courts in Maine were left with an open question of whether to continue 
to apply the Supreme Court’s burden-shifting analysis as articulated in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green,30 when deciding a motion for summary judgment in an 
employment discrimination case brought under state law.31  The question of the 
continuing vitality of the McDonnell Douglas analysis in employment 
discrimination cases at summary judgment is neither new,32 nor unique to Maine.33  
                                                                                                     
 21. Id. ¶ 15. 
 22. Id. ¶ 25 
 23. Id. ¶ 26. 
 24. See Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 29, 45 A.3d 722 (Silver, 
J., concurring). 
 25. Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J., concurring). 
 26. 2012 ME 80, 45 A.3d 722.  Although Justice Alexander joined the concurring opinion in 
Daniels, he was a member of the majority opinion in Trott. 
 27. See Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J., concurring).  See also Fuhrmann v. Staples 
the Office Superstore E., Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶ 13, 58 A.3d 1083 (acknowledging Justice Silver’s 
questioning of the application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to employment discrimination cases 
at the summary judgment stage). 
 28. Daniels, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 29, 45 A.3d 722 (Silver, J., concurring). 
 29. See ME. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Daniels, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 34, 45 A.3d 722 (Silver, J., concurring). 
 30. 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). 
 31. See Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J., concurring); Daniels, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 29, 45 
A.3d 722 (Silver, J., concurring) (stating that the analysis is “outdated, confusing, and unworkable”). 
 32. See Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 113 n.15 
(2007) (citing numerous longstanding criticisms of the analysis).  See also William R. Corbett, 
McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 202 n.15 
(2003) (noting that many scholars and employee rights advocates have called for abandonment of the 
analysis). 
 33. See Christopher J. Emden, Note, Subverting Rule 56? McDonnell Douglas, White v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., and the Mess of Summary Judgment in Mixed-Motive Cases, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. 
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At the same time, the issue of the remaining utility of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis stands on the cutting edge of employment discrimination practice, 
especially for cases facing disposition at summary judgment.34  Because summary 
judgment is granted more frequently in employment discrimination cases as 
compared with other civil suits,35 the stakes for both employees and employers are 
high.36 
Contrary to the concurrence’s reading of Trott, reasoning from first principles 
of summary judgment makes clear that it would be inconsistent to apply one 
interpretation of the substantive law at summary judgment and a different 
interpretation at trial.37  Courts have routinely applied the burden-shifting 
framework at summary judgment as a technique to guide the complexities of the 
record38 and the allocation of proof in employment discrimination cases.39  As 
originally envisioned by the Supreme Court, the analysis was designed to “frame 
the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair 
opportunity to demonstrate pretext” before the fact-finder at trial.40  Thus, the 
plaintiff’s rebuttal case on the issue of pretext constitutes an essential and necessary 
component of intentional discrimination substantive law.41 
This Note will proceed in three parts.  Part II will review the McDonnell 
Douglas analytical framework and its evolution.  After briefly touching on 
summary judgment determinations in Maine, Part II will then explore the use of the 
                                                                                                     
REV. 139, 154 (2010) (noting that the Baxter court’s decision that McDonnell Douglas does not apply to 
summary judgment “creates an official circuit split” for federal courts). 
 34. See Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s 
Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 681 (2013) (suggesting that the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
is no longer helpful to anyone given the evolution of employment law). 
 35. See id. at 672-73 (citing a recent Federal Judicial Center study of civil cases). 
 36. See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of 
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 221 n.68 (1993) (stating that the 
motion for “summary judgment has emerged as the predominant battleground for employers seeking to 
avoid discrimination trials.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 37. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).  For example, in considering 
the application of McDonnell Douglas to jury instructions in a case with “inferences that are to be 
derived from the underpinnings of the McDonnell Douglas-type prima facie case,” the 1st Circuit has 
stated that “[t]he jury should be told that, if it finds all the disputed elements and that the defendant’s 
reason is a pretext, it would be warranted in finding for the plaintiff on the ultimate issue of . . .  
discrimination.”  Loeb v. Textron, Inc. 600 F.2d 1003, 1018 (1979).  However, the 1st Circuit also 
acknowledged that “it is obvious that most cases will not come neatly packaged” in a pure McDonnell 
Douglas structure and that a “court should not force a case into a McDonnell Douglas format if it will 
merely divert the jury from the real issues.”  Id. 
 38. See Chin, supra note 34, at 675 (noting the difficulty of employment discrimination cases, 
which involve many discovery disputes, pro se litigants, and sometimes uneven lawyering, as well as 
“burdensome, time-consuming summary judgment motions with extensive records.”). 
 39. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 221 (stating the courts have “uniformly applied the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine approach to summary judgment); William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and 
Throwing Out Proof Structures: It is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 361, 380 (1998) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas proof structure has played an important 
role for courts in evaluating challenges to sufficiency of the evidence). 
 40. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981). 
 41. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 256 (concluding that the Supreme Court shaped the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine formula to make it easier for plaintiffs to prove discrimination, primarily because 
employers rarely leave behind incriminating direct evidence). 
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McDonnell Douglas analysis in Maine’s employment discrimination cases facing 
disposition at summary judgment.  Part III will examine the Trott decision and the 
concurring opinion.  Part IV will assess the Law Court’s rationale and the 
concurrence in light of the purposes behind the McDonnell Douglas framework.  
After examining broader criticisms of the framework, this Note ultimately 
concludes that Maine courts should continue to apply the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis, as well as the Trott principles, in employment discrimination cases at the 
summary judgment stage. 
II. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ANALYSIS IN MAINE’S EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CASES 
A. The Burden-Shifting Framework of McDonnell Douglas 
Forty years ago, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court 
introduced the standard analysis for individual claims of disparate treatment 
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42  Title VII of the Act prohibits 
employers from discriminating against individuals in the terms and conditions of 
employment on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”43  Thus, 
in a disparate treatment case, an employer treats some people differently than 
others because of a protected characteristic.44  In McDonnell Douglas, the critical 
issue before the Court was the order and allocation of proof in employment 
discrimination suits brought by private individuals against their employers.45  
Although several methods have evolved for proving disparate treatment by an 
employer against an employee,46 the Supreme Court designed the McDonnell 
Douglas proof structure in order to spotlight the circumstantial evidence of an 
employee alleging employment discrimination, especially when the employee lacks 
access to direct evidence of an employer’s discriminatory intent.47   
The Supreme Court did not mandate use of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.48  
However, it was the only method of proof for nearly ten years after the case was 
decided.49  The McDonnell Douglas analysis has become the predominant method 
                                                                                                     
 42. The Supreme Court underscored the Act’s purpose in saying, “[t]he broad, overriding interest, 
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured 
through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions.”  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 44. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (distinguishing 
disparate treatment from disparate impact). 
 45. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 800. 
 46. For a review of other methods of proving disparate treatment, including direct evidence and 
mixed-motives, see Miles F. Archer, Mullin v. Raytheon Company: The Threatened Vitality of 
Disparate Impact Under the ADEA, 52 ME. L. REV. 149, 154-56 (2000). 
 47. See Corbett, supra note 39, at 363 (noting the evidentiary difficulties of inquiries into an 
employer’s state of mind). 
 48. See Katz, supra note 32, at 117 (stating that the Supreme Court’s opinion in McDonnell 
Douglas did not include any discussion of whether the analysis was mandatory). 
 49. See id. 
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for analyzing claims of intentional employment discrimination.50  The Supreme 
Court shaped the burden-shifting analysis with the trial process in mind, providing 
plaintiffs with an opportunity to present a rebuttal case to the jury, focusing 
substantially on the question of the legitimacy of the defendant’s asserted reasons 
for the adverse employment action.51 
The Supreme Court has refined the McDonnell Douglas analysis in later 
cases.52  In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,53 the Court 
clarified that only the burden of production shifts to the defendant at the second 
step, and the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the 
plaintiff.”54  In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,55 the Court held that when a 
plaintiff discredits an employer’s articulated reason for the adverse employment 
action, it may permit the fact-finder to infer discriminatory intent.56  And although 
a plaintiff is not required to present additional evidence of discrimination beyond 
meeting the elements of the prima facie case, rejection of the employer’s proffered 
reason does not guarantee judgment for the plaintiff on the ultimate issue of 
discrimination.57  However, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,58 the 
Court clarified that additional independent evidence of discrimination is not 
required and that a plaintiff’s prima facie case, together with sufficient evidence to 
show that the employer’s articulated reason is false, would permit a finding of 
discrimination.59 
Causation is a central requirement of proof in any disparate treatment claim.60  
The McDonnell Douglas analysis directs the plaintiff to show causation by 
requiring a demonstration of “pretext.”61  The causation analysis relies on a set of 
successive inferences.62  The focus on pretext is an application of “the general 
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s 
dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt.”63  A plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                     
 50. Corbett, supra note 39, at 363.  See also Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Motions for Summary 
Judgment When Employers Offer Multiple Justifications for Adverse Employment Actions: Why the 
Exceptions Should Swallow the Rule, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 335, 336 (2002) (noting that the unanimous 
Supreme Court opinions in McDonnell Douglas and Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248 (1981), represent the “most commonly applied framework for litigating an employment 
discrimination lawsuit”). 
 51. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 220-21. 
 52. For a detailed description of the evolution of McDonnell Douglas in subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions, see Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Wither 
McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1892-1903 (2004). 
 53. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
 54. Id. at 253.  
 55. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
 56. Id. at 511. 
 57. See id. 
 58. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 59. Id. at 148-49. 
 60. See Katz, supra note 32, at 121 (stating that a plaintiff must show that the adverse action 
occurred “because of” a protected characteristic). 
 61. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). 
 62. See Katz, supra note 32, at 130 (describing the chain of inference as moving from “error, to lie, 
to cover-up, to discrimination”). 
 63. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (internal citations omitted). 
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attempts to prove causation in an employment discrimination case can be especially 
difficult,64 and can be shown in one of two ways: “but for” or “motivating factor” 
causation.65  Thus, the effect of the McDonnell Douglas framework is to provide an 
individual bringing suit against an employer with a target, or something to aim at in 
order to “smoke”66 out an employer’s unlawful act.67 
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the application of 
McDonnell Douglas to a motion for summary judgment, the Court provided some 
guidance on the question in Reeves, concerning determinations of sufficiency of the 
evidence and motions for judgment as a matter of law.68  There, the Court indicated 
that considerations of the evidence on a Rule 50 motion should adhere to the 
following principles: the court should review all the evidence in the record, as 
opposed to just the reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party;69 the court 
“must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may 
not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence;”70 and because 
credibility determinations and weighing the evidence are functions of the jury, the 
court should “give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that 
‘evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached.’”71 
B. Summary Judgment in Maine 
Summary judgment law in Maine is well-established.  “Summary judgment is 
appropriate when the portions of the record referenced in the statements of material 
fact disclose no genuine issues of material fact and reveal that one party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”72  A factual dispute is material if it could impact 
the outcome of the suit.73  Absent a factual dispute, there is no need for trial.74  
                                                                                                     
 64. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) (“[T]he allocation of 
burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended 
progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.”).  
Indeed, “the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that 
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by.”  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 65. See Katz, supra note 32, at 122 (noting that “a factor is a ‘motivating factor’ where it has some 
causal influence but does not rise to the level of ‘but for’”).  Although inapplicable to this case, with 
respect to claims of retaliation brought under federal law, the Supreme Court recently held that a 
plaintiff “must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse 
action by the employer.”  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).  In 
Nassar, the Court distinguished “status-based discrimination” from “employer retaliation” on account of 
protected activity and concluded that for textual and structural reasons, Title VII’s lessened causation 
standard under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) applies only to claims of the former type.  See id. at 2533. 
 66. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (requiring an employer to 
demonstrate at the second step of the analysis that “despite the smoke, there is no fire”). 
 67. See Katz, supra note 32, at 124-25 (describing the “target” analogy). 
 68. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (noting that the 
standards for granting summary judgment mirror the standards for granting judgment as a matter of 
law). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 151. 
 72. See ME. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶ 11, 915 A.2d 400.  
 73. Arrow Fastener Co. v. Wrabacon, 2007 ME 34, ¶ 15, 917 A.2d 123.  
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Furthermore, “evidentiary inferences based on credibility or weight are 
impermissible.”75  In short, summary judgment in Maine is only available in “those 
instances where the facts properly proffered would be flatly insufficient to support 
a judgment in favor of the nonmoving party as a matter of law.”76 
C. Application of McDonnell Douglas to Maine’s Employment Discrimination 
Cases Facing Disposition at Summary Judgment 
With the purpose of preventing “discrimination in employment, housing or 
access to public accommodations on account of race, color, religion, ancestry or 
national origin,”77 the Maine Legislature enacted the Maine Human Rights Act in 
1971, following enactment of federal antidiscrimination statutes and corresponding 
case law interpreting those statutes.78  By adopting safeguards in conformity with 
federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Maine Legislature intended courts to 
reference federal case law to “provide significant guidance in the construction of 
[the] statute.”79 
The Law Court first applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in Maine 
Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn,80 a case concerning two female 
applicants for police officer positions with the City of Auburn.81  Alleging sex 
discrimination in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act,82 the Law Court 
reviewed judgment for the defendant post-trial.  In an extensive opinion, Chief 
Justice McKusick articulated the unique method by which courts in Maine should 
evaluate employment discrimination evidence after trial, especially in light of 
federal legislation and case law.83  The Law Court identified the Supreme Court’s 
McDonnell Douglas opinion as the primary source of a “special methodology” by 
which courts should evaluate evidence in disparate treatment employment 
discrimination cases.84  The Law Court held that judges should apply the “three-
stage” framework85 “to the whole evidence presented by the parties” as the “proper 
method for evaluating the evidence presented at trial for cases arising under the 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Stanley v. Hancock Cnty. Comm’rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 19, 864 A.2d 169 (“A cornerstone of 
the rationale for having a summary judgment process is that a trial is not warranted if a party cannot 
identify admissible evidence that establishes an actual factual dispute.”). 
 75. Arrow Fastener Co., 2007 ME 34, ¶ 16, 917 A.2d 123 (citation omitted). 
 76. Id. ¶ 18. 
 77. P.L. 1971, ch. 501, § 1 (codified as amended at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4592 (1973)). 
 78. See Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979). 
 79. Id. (citations omitted).   
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1257. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1261.  See id. at 1262 n.13 (cautioning that the evaluation method discussed by the court 
does not concern “the order of evidence at trial or trial tactics,” but rather is a tool by which judges 
evaluate “after the trial is over . . . all the evidence to determine whether unlawful discrimination has 
been proved.”).  
 84. Id. at 1261. 
 85. See id. at 1262 (stating that the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff, who 
may assist the judge in rejecting the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason “by offering 
affirmative evidence of pretext or by the strength of the inference of discrimination arising from the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case,” and that the judge’s own credibility assessment of witnesses may justify 
rejection of the employer’s reason). 
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Maine Human Rights Act.”86 
The Law Court’s first application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to 
review of a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case 
appeared in the 2003 case of Doyle v. Department of Human Services.87  An 
employee for the State of Maine, Doyle asserted claims of discrimination, 
retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Maine Human Rights Act,88 
following her surgery and return to work.89  Doyle argued that DHS discriminated 
against her by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for her medical 
condition and then retaliated against her by subjecting her to a hostile work 
environment because of her complaints and requests for assistance.90  On her 
claims of discrimination and retaliation, the Law Court held that DHS was entitled 
to summary judgment because Doyle failed to generate an issue of material fact 
that the reasons given for her termination were pretextual.91 
The Law Court has since applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis at the 
summary judgment stage in six cases.92  The Law Court has stated that in order to 
survive a defense motion for summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis, plaintiffs must “establish[] a factual dispute as to whether a causal 
connection exists” between protected activity and an adverse employment action.93  
In addition, a claim for employment discrimination will not survive summary 
judgment if a plaintiff “relies on mere ‘conclusory allegations, improbable 
inferences, and unsupported speculation.’”94  Instead, a plaintiff must “assert 
sufficient facts, supported in the summary judgment record, from which a 
                                                                                                     
 86. Id. at 1268. 
 87. 2003 ME 61, ¶¶ 14-15, 824 A.2d 48. 
 88. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4634 (2013). 
 89. Doyle v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ¶ 7, 824 A.2d 48. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22.  The court also held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
because Doyle failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(h)(2).  See id. ¶ 13. 
 92. See Fuhrmann v. Staples the Office Superstore E., Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶¶ 13, 21, 58 A.3d 1083 
(holding that in its entirety, Fuhrmann produced sufficient evidence showing weaknesses and 
inconsistencies in the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons offered by Staples so as to generate an issue 
of fact, thereby precluding summary judgment); Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 
ME 80, ¶¶ 14, 22, 45 A.2d 80 (holding that “even if one party’s version of events appears more credible 
and persuasive to the court, the competing inferences” drawn from temporal proximity of the adverse 
action created a triable issue on the retaliation claim, thereby precluding summary judgment);  Cookson 
v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, ¶¶ 15, 25, 974 A.2d 276 (holding that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because Cookson produced sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to reasonably conclude 
that the school district’s decision was not based on Cookson’s conduct, but instead motivated by 
discrimination); Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶¶ 13, 28, 915 A.2d 400 (holding that there 
was sufficient temporal proximity between protected activity and discharge, as well as additional 
evidence of causation to preclude the grant of summary judgment); LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 
2006 ME 130, ¶¶ 19, 25, 909 A.2d 629 (holding that LePage failed to make out a prima facie case 
because he did not suffer from an adverse employment action); Stanley v. Hancock Cnty. Comm’rs, 
2004 ME 157, ¶¶ 12, 26, 864 A.2d 169 (holding that the summary judgment record failed to establish a 
genuine issue of disputed fact on the issue of causation under the WPA claim when Stanley failed to 
contradict in his statement of material facts that his poor performance was not the reason for his 
discharge). 
 93. Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 24, 864 A.2d 169. 
 94. Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 22, 974 A.2d 276 (quoting Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador 
Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
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reasonable fact-finder could disbelieve the employer’s proffered rationale and 
conclude that illegal discrimination was the true motivating factor.”95  The court 
has also stated that a plaintiff can meet his or her burden of production by 
presenting affirmative evidence of “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered reasons for its action 
that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and . . 
. infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.”96  
III. TROTT V. H.D. GOODALL HOSPITAL 
A. Factual Background 
H.D. Goodall Hospital, a not-for-profit hospital located in Sanford, Maine, 
employed Claire Trott as a nurse from 1989 until March 2009,97 when the Hospital 
terminated Trott’s employment.98  In December 2007, a patient died during Trott’s 
shift,99 and Trott subsequently spoke with the deceased patient’s daughter, 
speculating as to potential causes of death including a possible morphine 
overdose.100  Soon thereafter, the patient’s estate initiated a wrongful death suit 
against the Hospital.101 
Between 1998 and 2007, the Hospital’s performance evaluations of Trott were 
consistently positive.102  In 2007, and just prior to the patient’s death, the Hospital 
installed a new computer system to maintain patient records; the system was 
complex and nurses had difficulty navigating and using the new software.103  One 
year later, in October 2008, the Hospital gave Trott a 1.5% raise after a positive 
performance evaluation, but she was advised that she needed improvement in the 
areas of patient assessment and medication documentation.104  Trott achieved the 
necessary improvement in the areas specified and the Hospital awarded Trott an 
additional 1.5% raise in January 2009.105  One month later, Trott participated in a 
deposition in connection with the wrongful death suit.106  In preparation for the 
deposition, the Hospital’s attorney indicated to Trott that she was to blame for the 
wrongful death suit against the Hospital because Trott suggested to the patient’s 
family that a morphine overdose was a possible cause of death.107  
The plaintiff’s attorney took Trott’s deposition testimony concerning her 
observations of the patient prior to his death, as well as the associated entries that 
                                                                                                     
 95. Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 23, 974 A.2d 276. 
 96. Id. ¶ 17 (quoting Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 97. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 1. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 7. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 3, Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, 66 A.3d 7 (No. 
YOR-12-213). 
 102. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 1-3. 
 103. Id. at 3-4.  See also id. at 19 (indicating that the software included a feature which allowed the 
automatic recall of prior patient assessments for use as current assessments). 
 104. Id. at 8. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 8-9. 
582 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:2 
Trott made in the computer medical record to reflect the patient’s status.108  Trott 
was not shown any of the patient’s charts prior to her deposition testimony.109  The 
attorney proceeded to elicit testimony from Trott that conflicted with the patient’s 
record: Trott testified that the patient was asleep,110 whereas the plaintiff’s attorney 
pointed out that the medical record indicated that the patient was “alert, oriented 
times three” and had an “unsteady gait.”111  When asked to explain the discrepancy 
between her visual observation and the computer entry, Trott testified that “this 
electronic thing is new to me . . . I don’t know how to explain it.”112  Trott further 
testified that the computer entry was not based on a contemporaneous observation 
of the patient, but that she had been relying on her recent memory of the patient 
from church when she entered the information into the computer.113  Although a 
few Hospital administrators indicated to Trott that they knew she had not made the 
erroneous entries on purpose,114 Trott was discharged from her employment with 
the Hospital on March 26, 2009, the day after she reviewed and signed her 
deposition transcript.115 
The Hospital sent Trott a letter formally terminating her employment on the 
grounds that the medical record entry Trott described in her deposition constituted 
a falsification of a patient medical record which is a terminable offense within the 
meaning of the Hospital’s Conduct and Discipline policy.116  A subsequent letter to 
the state nursing board, required by law, cited additional grounds for discharge, 
including the same issues identified in Trott’s most recent performance evaluation: 
the need for improvement in documentation and medication administration.117 
B. Procedural History 
Trott filed a complaint against the Hospital alleging that, when the Hospital 
discharged her as a result of her deposition testimony in the wrongful death lawsuit, 
it violated the Whistleblower Protection Act.118  The Hospital moved for summary 
judgment, asserting no dispute regarding the fact that it discharged Trott because of 
her allegedly undisputed deposition testimony evidencing the fact that she falsified 
a patient’s medical record.119  The Hospital further argued that Trott presented no 
evidence of pretext.120  Trott opposed the motion and asserted that a jury could 
                                                                                                     
 108. Id. at 9. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 4. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that Trott testified that Hospital staff 
told Trott that she did not falsify the medical record). 
 115. Id. at 12. 
 116. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 8; see also id. at 3 (describing the fact that 
“recording of false information is classified as a ‘major breach’ of Goodall policy” and grounds for 
termination). 
 117. See id. at 9 (identifying “patient assessment, reassessment, clinical judgment, and 
documentation” as grounds for discharge). 
 118. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 9. 
 119. Id. at 11. 
 120. Id. 
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reasonably conclude that either a software glitch caused the errors in the patient’s 
record or that Trott simply entered the wrong information.121  The Superior Court 
granted summary judgment because it concluded that Trott failed to carry her 
burden to produce evidence that the Hospital discharged her because she 
participated in the deposition and suit against the Hospital.122  Trott appealed.123 
C. Arguments on Appeal 
Trott argued on appeal that the Hospital’s claim that she falsified a medical 
record served as pretext to terminate her employment in retaliation for the 
deposition testimony she gave in the wrongful death suit.124  Trott further alleged 
that the reason behind the improper medical record entry may have been that she 
mistakenly entered the wrong information into the computer,125 and that there was 
sufficient evidence to show that the computer medical record system was error 
prone.126  Trott also contended that because counsel for the Hospital did not review 
the deceased patient’s medical records with her prior to her deposition, she became 
flustered during questioning and offered conflicting reasons for the discrepancy.127  
Furthermore, Trott asserted that because the adverse employment action occurred 
in close proximity to conduct protected under the statute, the burden shifted to the 
Hospital to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.128  
Finally, Trott argued that there was sufficient evidence of pretext: the medical 
record falsification reason produced by the Hospital was weak; the Hospital offered 
contradictory reasons for discharge on appeal as compared with its letter to the 
state nursing board; the Hospital’s treatment of Trott was inconsistent with that of 
other nurses on staff; and the Hospital exhibited animus towards Trott.129 
The Hospital argued, in contrast, that it terminated Trott’s employment as a 
result of her admissions made during the wrongful death suit deposition, and more 
specifically, that Trott entered “information into a patient’s medical record without 
actually assessing the patient in the hospital.”130  The Hospital contended that there 
was no factual dispute concerning the substance of Trott’s deposition testimony 
and that the actions she admitted to as part of the deposition constituted a violation 
of Hospital policy, thereby supporting grounds for termination.131  Finally, the 
Hospital argued that Trott had conceded on appeal the legitimacy of the Hospital’s 
non-retaliatory reason and waived any further challenge to the sufficiency of the 
                                                                                                     
 121. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 19.  However, the Hospital’s policy did not 
distinguish between a recording error and an intentional falsification of a medical record.  See Brief of 
Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 3. 
 122. Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 10, 66 A.3d 7. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 14. 
 125. Id. at 10. 
 126. Id. at 19. 
 127. Id. at 20. 
 128. Id. at 15. 
 129. Id. at 21-24.  Trott asserted that on appeal, the Hospital did not include the additional reasons 
for discharge (poor documentation and medication administration) which it had asserted to the State 
Board of Nursing, suggesting further evidence of pretext.  See id. at 23. 
 130. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 16. 
 131. Id. 
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Hospital’s evidence by failing to dispute the Hospital’s rationale in her 
memorandum of law in opposition to the Hospital’s motion for summary 
judgment.132  For these reasons, the Hospital asserted that the only issue on appeal 
was whether there were genuine issues of material fact concerning pretext,133 and 
that summary judgment was properly granted because Trott failed to produce 
evidence that the Hospital based its decision on Trott’s participation in the 
wrongful death suit as opposed to her admissions made within the deposition 
itself.134 
D. Decision of the Law Court 
The Maine Human Rights Act provides an employee with a cause of action 
against an employer for discrimination resulting from an employee’s participation 
in a court action.135  Writing for the majority, Justice Levy concluded that summary 
judgment had been granted in error because Trott met her burden of production for 
each element of her claim, and further established a genuine issue of material fact 
as to the existence of a “causal link” between her WPA protected activity and her 
discharge.136   
Invoking the analysis used in prior employment discrimination cases, the court 
applied the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to evaluate 
“whether Trott presented sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment . . . 
.”137  Citing the “temporal nexus” analysis of Watt v. UniFirst Corp.,138 the court 
concluded that Trott met her initial burden of showing a prima facie case of 
discrimination: Trott produced evidence that the Hospital discharged her forty-one 
days after she participated in the deposition, and one day after she signed her 
deposition.139  Pointing to the noncontemporaneous observations of the patient that 
Trott used to make the computer medical record entry, as well as evidence that 
making such an entry constituted falsification of a medical record and a terminable 
offense, the court concluded that the Hospital met its burden to produce evidence of 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Trott.140  At that point, the 
court stated that the burden of production shifted back to Trott to “present evidence 
that the Hospital’s stated reason for her discharge—the falsification of records—
                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 18-19. 
 133. Id. at 18. 
 134. Id. at 22.  The Hospital further argued that there was no evidence that Trott was treated 
differently from other nurses or that the Hospital advanced contradictory reasons for her discharge, and 
that the temporal proximity of her discharge and deposition testimony was not evidence of causation 
because her admissions of misconduct occurred at the same time as her protected activity.  See id. at 27-
30. 
 135. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4572(1)(A), 4621 (2013); 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(C) (2013).  For an in-depth 
discussion of the history of the Maine Human Rights Act, see Katherine I. Rand, Taking Care of 
Business and Protecting Maine’s Employees: Supervisor Liability for Employment Discrimination 
Under the Maine Human Rights Act, 55 ME. L. REV. 427, 442-43 (2003). 
 136. Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 25, 66 A.3d 7. 
 137. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. 
 138. 2009 ME 47, ¶ 33, 969 A.2d 897. 
 139. Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 16, 66 A.3d 7. 
 140. Id. ¶ 17. 
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was a pretext.”141 
In order for the case to survive summary judgment, the court noted that it 
would have to conclude that “no reasonable fact-finder could find pretext on the 
summary judgment record.”142  Trott, therefore, was required to present “sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the employer’s motivation for 
the adverse employment action.”143  For there to be a genuine issue of material fact, 
the court indicated that the evidence would require “a fact-finder to choose between 
competing versions of the truth.”144 
The Law Court then articulated three principles to guide lower courts 
considering employment discrimination cases on summary judgment: First, the 
court noted that “it is a failure of proof, and not the weight that might be assigned 
to the proof” that determines the appropriateness of summary judgment.145  Second, 
the court noted that direct evidence of discrimination is rarely available in 
employment discrimination cases, and that these cases turn on credibility 
determinations and circumstantial evidence.146  Credibility determinations, the 
court stated, are inappropriate at the summary judgment stage when undisputed 
facts are gleaned from a paper record as opposed to live witness testimony.147  
Additionally, the court was careful to note that circumstantial evidence can give 
rise to competing inferences.148  Third, when evaluating the summary judgment 
record, courts should distinguish between a “weak case of pretext” and “no 
case.”149  The court went on to state that judges should evaluate an employee’s 
proof with an “awareness that reasonable jurors can and often do disagree as to 
both the weight and meaning of evidence.”150  Using these principles, the court then 
articulated three ways in which a reasonable juror could find the Hospital’s 
discharge of Trott to be pretextual.151  When “[v]iewed from the perspective of the 
full range of reasonable perceptions of the summary judgment record,” the court 
concluded that Trott “established a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence 
of a ‘causal link’ between her WPA-protected activity and her discharge,”152 and 
that Trott had therefore met her burden of production on all the elements of her 
WPA claim.153  The court vacated the judgment and remanded for further 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. ¶ 18.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (citation omitted). 
 145. Id. ¶ 19. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. ¶ 20. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. ¶¶ 22-24 (concluding that a juror could reasonably conclude that Trott’s contradictory 
deposition testimony provided a weak basis for the Hospital’s stated belief that Trott falsified a medical 
record; that a reasonable juror could conclude that the Hospital believed Trott had made some kind of 
negligent error, which would contradict its contention that it discharged Trott for falsifying a record; and 
Trott’s receipt of a merit raise just prior to her deposition testimony could lead a reasonable juror to 
conclude that the grounds for discharge listed in the letter to the nursing board were evidence of pretext 
to “conceal a true, unlawful reason for the discharge”). 
 152. Id. ¶ 25. 
 153. Id. ¶ 26. 
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proceedings.154 
E. The Concurrence 
Although concurring in the court’s judgment, Justice Silver wrote separately to 
reaffirm the position that courts “should not apply the three-step, burden-shifting 
analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green to discrimination claims at 
the summary judgment stage.”155  The concurrence first emphasized that weight or 
credibility determinations are “inappropriate at the summary judgment stage,” and 
that courts must be especially cautious in employment discrimination cases because 
“issues of motive and intent are present and turn on circumstantial evidence from 
which reasonable jurors could draw competing, plausible inferences.”156  The 
concurrence then framed the McDonnell Douglas analysis as “merely a procedural 
device that ‘does nothing more than organize the record to determine whether the 
plaintiff has offered evidence of causation between the employer’s adverse action 
and the employee’s [protected status or activity], and whether the defendant has 
offered evidence to put that issue into dispute.’”157  
Calling the burden-shifting analysis under McDonnell Douglas a “rigid and 
artificial trifurcation of the causation analysis,”158 the concurrence asserted that in 
employment discrimination cases, courts need only engage in the straightforward 
inquiry provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure: whether the plaintiff has shown a 
genuine issue of material fact,159 and whether there exists a prima facie cause of 
action.160  The concurrence asserted that the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
“confuses rather than clarifies the ultimate issue in employment discrimination 
cases: whether there is evidence of discrimination”161 and further questioned the 
continued application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis on the basis that it is a 
distraction.162 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The holding in Trott—that summary judgment is inappropriate in employment 
discrimination cases in Maine when a plaintiff offers sufficient evidence to show 
the presence of a genuine issue of material fact from which a reasonable juror could 
find pretext—is justified by the purposes behind the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, the line of Maine cases preceding Trott which apply the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis at summary judgment, and finally, the familiarity of the analysis 
within the common experience of Maine lawyers and judges.  Indeed, Trott stands 
                                                                                                     
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. ¶ 28 (Silver, J., concurring). 
 156. Id. ¶ 27. 
 157. Id. ¶ 28 (citation omitted). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See ME. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 160. Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 29, 66 A.3d 7. 
 161. Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 29, 45 A.3d 
722). 
 162. See id. (affirming that summary judgment in employment discrimination matters is only 
appropriate if “no reasonable juror could conclude that the plaintiff proved her claim of discrimination” 
when viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). 
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for the proposition that when employee-plaintiffs produce some evidence of a 
dispute on the issue of pretext, with adequate summary judgment record support, 
the case should proceed to trial.163  Thus, the criticisms of McDonnell Douglas as 
being impractical and cumbersome cannot overcome the underlying policies and 
purposes of the analysis, nor do they support abandoning its application in Maine 
employment discrimination cases at summary judgment. 
Pretext is the ultimate issue in almost every disparate treatment employment 
discrimination case;164 it is the crux of the case.165  Whereas the question of pretext 
allows a fact-finder at trial to consider both the credibility of an employer’s 
proffered nondiscriminatory reason as well as the evidence educed at trial, the Trott 
court correctly distinguished that the summary judgment inquiry only permits a 
judge to determine whether the plaintiff has put forward sufficient evidence from 
which a reasonable fact-finder could disbelieve an employer’s proffered rationale 
and conclude that discrimination motivated the result.166  In the McDonnell 
Douglas context, the latter inquiry only appears to be a credibility determination 
because the burden of production has most recently shifted from the defendant back 
to the plaintiff, suggesting that the plaintiff also holds the burden as the nonmoving 
party on the motion for summary judgment.167  Thus, the unusual order and 
allocation of proof for employment discrimination cases facing disposition at 
summary judgment may serve as one of the primary sources of the general 
confusion and criticism.168 
As conceived by the Supreme Court, the original purpose of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis was to assist the plaintiff in surfacing the unlawful motivation 
that may have prompted an employer’s adverse action.169  Using circumstantial 
evidence, the framework permits a fact-finder to draw the inference that an 
employer’s reason for discharge is not believable, and therefore, that the employee 
was the victim of discrimination.170  Although the inquiry is binary, in that it 
presents a yes or no question for the fact-finder concerning the employer’s asserted 
                                                                                                     
 163. See Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that “where a 
plaintiff in a discrimination case makes out a prima facie case and the issue becomes whether the 
employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination, courts must be ‘particularly 
cautious’ about granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment.”). 
 164. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).  See also Chin, supra 
note 34, at 679 (stating that the focus of a summary judgment determination should be on the “ultimate 
issue” – whether a reasonable jury could find that “more likely than not, the employer’s decision was 
motivated at least in part by discrimination”). 
 165. See Katz, supra note 32, at 125 n.64 (citing commentators who place emphasis on the pretext 
prong of the analysis as the focus of the “action”).   
 166. See Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 23, 974 A.2d 276. 
 167. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 241 (“Many courts approaching a summary judgment motion 
in a civil rights case . . . require a plaintiff to prove that she was discriminated against.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., 
concurring) (distinguishing the burden-shifting analysis from the usual procedure at summary judgment 
to “set forth the elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action and then determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable person to find that each element has been proved.”). 
 169. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 215 (stating that the Supreme Court recognized that showing 
intent to discriminate is “difficult to prove absent a smoking gun”).  
 170. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). 
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reason,171 the proof structure was never intended as an inflexible model from which 
courts and lawyers should not deviate.172 
Despite laudable goals, McDonnell Douglas has many critics.173  The 
criticisms of the McDonnell Douglas analysis fall into three categories: First, some 
critics argue that the analysis only functions where an employer’s reason is false or 
was driven by conscious discrimination.174  Second, others assert that the 
framework is a distracting and formalistic procedural overlay that encourages 
lawyers and judges to compartmentalize evidence at the expense of the big 
picture.175  And third, critics suggest that the analysis operates as a waste of time,176 
while promoting judicial error and poor lawyering.177 
In light of these criticisms, the concurrence in Trott argues that continued 
application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis in Maine’s employment 
discrimination cases at summary judgment has the procedural consequence of 
encouraging juries, lawyers, and judges to take their eye off of the ball.178  The 
critique is that the framework takes the focus off of the ultimate issue, and instead, 
places it on the “ping pong-like match”179 of shifting burdens.180  There is support 
for the concurrence’s argument that what began as a method of proof to assure 
plaintiffs their day in court,181 has evolved into a cumbersome eight-part 
framework.182 
Reversion to a “standard” Rule 56 inquiry would be inconsistent with the goal 
of eliminating workplace discrimination.183  A court’s use of such an analysis, as 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Zimmer, supra note 52, at 1897-98 (indicating that the McDonnell analysis has been termed 
the “circumstantial evidence” test, the “indirect” method of proof, the “pretext” method, and the “single 
motive” method). 
 172. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
 173. See Katz, supra note 32, at 113 n.15 (providing a sampling of scholarly criticisms). 
 174. See id. at 178-79 (asserting that the McDonnell Douglas analysis only operates where the 
employer’s proffered reason is false or a product of conscious discrimination). 
 175. See id. at 168 (indicating judges and juries “get so caught up in the mechanics of burden-shifting 
and pretext” that they lose sight of the ultimate question).  The concurrence in Trott would likely fall 
into this category.  See Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J., 
concurring). 
 176. Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring) 
(“To be sure, proof of the prima facie case put the burden on the employer to produce evidence of a 
proper motive.  But doesn’t the employer almost always do that . . . so what has been accomplished?”). 
 177. See id. at 1221 (asserting that “the artificiality of the framework exacts a significant, 
unnecessary expense—in terms of both wasted judicial effort and greater opportunity for judicial 
error.”). 
 178. Chin & Golinsky, supra note 14, at 660 (“The McDonnell Douglas test . . . actually invites 
juries and courts to lose sight of the ultimate issue by focusing their attention away from the existence or 
non-existence of discrimination.”). 
 179. Chin, supra note 34, at 677. 
 180. See id. at 681 (criticizing plaintiff’s lawyers who do not focus sufficiently on proof of the 
ultimate issue of discrimination, and instead rely too heavily on the analysis to do the yeoman’s work of 
constructing the case). 
 181. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979) (“Proof of the McDonnell 
Douglas-type prima facie case assures the plaintiff his day in court despite the unavailability of direct 
evidence . . . .”). 
 182. See Chin, supra note 34, at 678. 
 183. Such an approach might entail, “first, evaluating plaintiff’s proof, direct or otherwise, of 
discrimination; second evaluating defendant’s proof that it did not discriminate . . . ; and third, 
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applied to a paper record, could substantively deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity 
to focus the question of causation (before a jury) on the issue of pretext in response 
to an employer’s alleged legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for undertaking an 
adverse employment action.  In the name of simplifying the inquiry from a judge’s 
point of view, the burden on the plaintiff would increase and would represent a 
shift in the substantive law.  Moreover, whereas a traditional prima facie case at 
summary judgment requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that she can meet the burden 
of production for each element of a claim under the substantive law,184 a “prima 
facie case” in the employment discrimination context represents only the first part 
of a three-part analysis specifically designed to surface circumstantial evidence of 
intentional discrimination.  The concurrence in Trott falls victim to the ambiguity 
in the phrase “prima facie case,”185 and neglects to consider the substantive law 
impact of discarding the requirement that an employer select and assert a 
nondiscriminatory reason which the plaintiff can then attempt to show as pretext.186  
Thus, first principles of summary judgment, the line of employment discrimination 
cases in Maine applying McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment, the fact that 
the framework forces the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason which 
the plaintiff can then refute by producing evidence showing a genuine dispute of 
material fact, and the familiarity of the analysis among Maine lawyers and judges 
all support continued application of McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment.187 
The Trott majority recognized the criticisms of the analysis and used the 
opinion as an opportunity to sharpen the effectiveness of the McDonnell Douglas 
inquiry, thereby signaling to lawyers and judges that the burden-shifting analysis is 
a valuable interpretive device, when properly applied.  The Trott court set forth 
three guiding principles that courts should follow when deciding employment 
discrimination cases at summary judgment.  After determining whether the parties 
have complied with the requirements of Rule 56(h)(2), courts should first refrain 
from weighing the evidence presented by either side.188  Second, courts should not 
engage in credibility determinations at summary judgment because circumstantial 
                                                                                                     
evaluating the evidenced as a whole,” and in the context of summary judgment, resolve “all conflicts in 
the proof and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”  Chin & Golinsky, supra note 
14, at 673. 
 184. See Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 29, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted). 
 185. See id. (asserting that the straightforward inquiry asks whether the undisputed material facts 
establish a prima facie cause of action). 
 186. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 244 (“The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine formula is the 
substantive anti-discrimination law.”  And, Liberty Lobby requires that courts consider the substantive 
law in summary judgment determinations.). 
 187. Indeed, the approach suggested by the concurrence has been followed in only two other states.  
See Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 224 P.3d 458, 463 (Idaho 2008) (concluding that while the 
burden-shifting analysis is applicable at trial, it should not be applied at summary judgment); Heng v. 
Rotech Med. Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389, 401 (N.D. 2004) (stating that McDonnell Douglas has “little or no 
application at the summary judgment stage”); Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 785 
(Tenn. 2010) (holding that “the McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable at the summary 
judgment stage because it is incompatible with Tennessee summary judgment jurisprudence.”), 
superseded by statute, Discrimination-Retaliatory Discharge-Claims, ch. 461, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts § 2 
(2011) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(g) (West, Westlaw through 2013 legislation)). 
 188. See Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 19, 66 A.3d 7. 
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evidence can give rise to competing inferences.189   Third, courts should clearly 
distinguish between “weak” cases of pretext and the absence of any case at all.190  
And finally, courts should view the evidence “from the perspective of the full range 
of reasonable perceptions of the summary judgment record.”191  In spite of any 
potential difficulty in applying McDonnell Douglas, the majority’s final instruction 
to view the entirety of the summary judgment record reminds and encourages 
lawyers and judges to remain focused on the “ultimate issue.”192 
V. CONCLUSION 
Few meritorious employment discrimination claims make their way to court, 
let alone to trial.193  The Law Court’s articulation of the Trott guiding principles 
indicates that the McDonnell Douglas analysis should continue to be applied in 
Maine employment discrimination cases facing disposition at summary judgment, 
and that the threshold for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment should not be 
insurmountable.  The analysis supports congressional and judicial policy objectives 
aimed at assisting plaintiffs who may be victims of employment discrimination.  
Furthermore, continued application of McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment 
necessarily targets the inquiry for all parties on the question of pretext.  Thus, the 
court in Trott implicitly and properly affirmed that the analysis has sustained 
application at summary judgment.  To hold otherwise would violate first principles 
of summary judgment and conflict with broader societal goals of discouraging 
employment discrimination. 
                                                                                                     
 189. See id.  See also McGinley, supra note 36, at 256 (arguing that courts can reconcile the 
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis at summary judgment by avoiding “automatically crediting 
defendants’ reasons, drawing inferences in defendants’ favor, deciding witnesses’ credibility on paper 
and requiring plaintiffs to prove their cases at the summary judgment stage.”). 
 190. Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 20, 66 A.3d 7. 
 191. Id. ¶ 25.  See also Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1268 (Me. 
1979) (cautioning that judges should apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis to the “whole evidence 
presented”). 
 192. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Katy Rand, Maine Celebrates 40 Years of Anti-Discrimination Law: A Conversation with 
Maine Human Rights Commission Executive Director Patricia Ryan, 26 ME. B.J. 77, 78 (2011) 
(“Complaints before the Commission are resolved in basically three ways: approximately one-third are 
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